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This paper examines the robustness of alliance formation in a three-player, two-stage game
in which each of two players compete against a third player in disjoint sets of contests.
Although the players with the common opponent share no common interests, we ﬁnd that
under the lottery contest success function (CSF) there exists a range of parameter conﬁgu-
rations in which the players with the common opponent have incentive to form an alliance
involving a pre-conﬂict transfer of resources. Models that utilize the lottery CSF typically
yield qualitatively diﬀerent results from those arising in models with the auction CSF (Fang
2002). However, under the lottery and the auction CSFs, the parameter conﬁgurations within
which players with a common opponent form an alliance are closely related. Our results,
thus, provide a partial robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D74
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Utilizing a two-stage game of alliance formation and multi-battle conﬂict, this paper ex-
amines the robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances across two benchmark
contest success functions (henceforth CSFs), the lottery and auction CSFs. Our focus is
on alliance formation in the case that alliance members lack common interests other than
a common opponent. In this framework, battle lines are exogenous as in the economics of
alliances literature originating with Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).1 The
combination of exogenous battle lines with alliance beneﬁts that are both rival and excludable
provides a point of departure from the alliance as a public good approach and a formaliza-
tion of the logic that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ In equilibrium, pre-conﬂict
transfers of resources among alliance members aﬀect the strategic choices of the common
enemy, thereby creating strategic externalities. Thus, even if ex post transfers between the
two alliance members are not feasible, there exists a range of parameters in which strategic
externalities are suﬃcient to generate individually rational ex ante transfers of resources.
Under the lottery CSF at each component contest, each player’s probability of winning a
given component contest is proportional to his share of the total resources allocated to that
contest. This corresponds to the commonly used case of the general-ratio form Tullock CSF
with r =1 . 2 Alternatively, if the outcome in each of the component contests, or battleﬁelds,
is determined by the auction CSF, then within each contest the winner is the player that
allocates the higher level of resources to that contest. This corresponds to the limiting case
of the general-ratio form Tullock CSF with r = ∞. These two benchmark CSFs capture
extreme points in the spectrum of exogenous noise in the CSFs in the component contests.
The auction CSF has no noise, and the lottery CSF has a large amount of noise.3
In this paper, we characterize — for both the case that ex post transfers among alliance
members are feasible and the case that they are not — the parameter conﬁgurations in which,
under the lottery CSF, the players with the common opponent have incentive to form, prior
to the conﬂict with the common opponent, an alliance involving an individually rational
ex ante transfer of resources. The corresponding characterization for the auction CSF is
1See also Sandler and Cauley (1975), Sandler (1977, 1999), Murdoch and Sandler (1982, 1984), Arce M.
and Sandler (2001), and Ihori and McGuire (2007).







i is the probability that player A wins the contest. The case where r = 1 corresponds to
the lottery CSF and r = ∞ to the auction CSF. The parameter, r, speciﬁes the level of noise or randomness
in the contest. As r increases the amount of exogenous noise in the CSF decreases.
3For more information on the level of noise implied in the lottery CSF, see Konrad and Kovenock (2009).
1given by Kovenock and Roberson (2010a).4 In comparing the regions of alliance formation
under the lottery and auction CSFs, we ﬁnd that the ranges of parameter conﬁgurations in
which the players with the common opponent have incentive to form an alliance involving
a pre-conﬂict transfer of resources are nearly identical. This applies to both alliances with
and without commitment. In those parameter conﬁgurations in which the alliance formation
boundaries diﬀer under the two CSFs, the alliance formation boundary under the all-pay
auction CSF model is less stringent than the one for the lottery CSF (i.e. alliance formation
is more likely when the CSF has less exogenous noise). This paper, thus, provides a partial
robustness result for ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances.
In general, large ﬂuctuations in the level of exogenous noise in the general ratio-form
contest success function result in qualitatively diﬀerent equilibrium behavior. In particular,
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) and Alcalde and Dahm (2009) both show that in the
case of a single contest with two players,5 there is a structural break in the nature of the
equilibrium strategies at r =2 . I fr ≥ 2, then there exists an equilibrium which exhibits
properties that are similar to the unique equilibrium in the two-player all-pay auction, with
the auction CSF (see Hillman and Riley 1989 and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1996). The
condition that r ≥ 2 implies that the amount of noise in the CSF must be suﬃciently small.
When r<2 (as with the lottery CSF), this relationship breaks down. In this context, Fang
(2002) shows that several results that arise under the auction CSF, such as Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries’s (1993) exclusion principle6 and Che and Gale’s (1998) result on caps on
lobbying,7 fail to hold under the lottery CSF.
Furthermore, in two-player games involving competition over a set of component contests
that are structurally linked there are a number of important diﬀerences between the outcomes
arising under the lottery CSF and those arising under the auction CSF.8 This includes games
where the objective is to win a majority of contests (for the lottery CSF see Snyder 1989
and Klumpp and Polborn 2006 and for the auction CSF see Szentes and Rosenthal 2003 and
Laslier 2003), games of attack and defense of a network of targets (for the lottery CSF see
Clark and Konrad 2007 for the auction CSF see Kovenock and Roberson 2010c), and the case
4Under the auction CSF, this game becomes a multi-player, multi-front variation of the Colonel Blotto
game.
5Alcalde and Dahm (2009) allow for two or more players.
6Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries’s (1993) exclusion principle states that a revenue maximizing auctioneer
may have incentive to exclude a bidder with a high valuation for the prize in order to foster competition
among a set of bidders with lower valuations for the prize.
7Che and Gale (1998) show that an exogenous cap on bids may provide a competitive advantage to a
player with a lower valuation and thereby increase the expected revenue from the contest.
8See Kovenock and Roberson (2010b) for a survey of this literature.
2of a budget constraint on expenditures across the set of component contests (for the lottery
CSF see Friedman 1958 and Robson 2005 for the auction CSF see Roberson 2006 and Hart
2008). In general, the diﬀerence in the outcomes for these multiple contest games centers on
the fact that under the auction CSF a mixed strategy is a multidimensional joint distribution
function and the linkages between the contests lead to endogenous correlation structures
in the equilibrium mixed strategies. Conversely, under the lottery CSF the assumption
of exogenous noise generates a situation in which the ﬁrst-order conditions may be used
to characterize the pure-strategy equilibrium. This marginal analysis frequently leads to
tradeoﬀs that are qualitatively diﬀerent from those arising under the auction CSF.
Although the exogenous battle lines feature of the model examined here is most closely
aligned with the economics of alliances literature, there are a number of related approaches
to the alliance formation problem.9 Closely related to our focus is the literature on truels.
For example Dimico and Seidmann (2010) examine a three-player model involving three
component contests in which the outcome at each component contest is determined by the
aggregate resource levels of the groups engaged in that component contest.10 Also related
are the three-player one-cake and three-player three-cake problems examined by Skaperdas
(1998). However, each of these formulations of the alliance problem diﬀers from our focus
in that battle lines are endogenous and any combination of players may form an alliance
that competes against the remaining player. Thus, these models show how players optimally
choose a common opponent and the nature of the resulting competition. In contrast, by
emphasizing exogenous battle lines and the resulting alliance transfers, the focus of our
model is on situations in which rational actors face an exogenously determined common
opponent. Clearly, there are number of instances in which historical and/or geopolitical
realities create such an environment. In such cases, our analysis shows that the strategic
externalities arising from the presence of a common enemy are largely robust to ﬂuctuations
to the speciﬁcation of the contest success function.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 provides a formal description of
the two-stage alliance formation game. In section 3 we provide suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a self-enforcing alliance without commitment when the component contests have
the lottery CSF and compare those conditions to the ones arising under the auction CSF. In
section 4 we relax the assumption that ex post transfers are not possible and examine the
nature of alliances when the alliance members act cooperatively as a single entity. Section 5
9For surveys of the alliance literature see Bloch (2009) and Konrad (2009).
10See also Shubik (1954), Kilgour and Brams (1997) and Bossert, Brams, and Kilgour (2002).
3concludes.
2 The Model
We examine a two-stage game that builds upon Friedman’s (1958) multi-item contest model.11
There are three players, {A,x,y}, and two disjoint sets of contests in which each component
contest has the lottery CSF. The disjoint sets of contests correspond to separate fronts in a
larger conﬂict. There are a number of classic examples of this type of conﬂict (e.g. World
War II in which Germany faced the Allied forces and the Soviet Union on disjoint fronts).
Players A, x, and y are initially endowed with a ﬁxed amount of a one-dimensional
resource denoted RA, Rx, and Ry, respectively. Resource endowments are strictly positive
and cannot be consumed. Therefore any unused resources have no value. It is assumed that
all players are risk neutral. Let Ij = {1,2,...,n j} denote the set of nj contests in which
player A is competing with player j ∈{ x,y}. Winning contest i ∈ Ij has value vi,j to both
players A and j. Denote the total value of the set Ij of contests as: Vj ≡
￿
i∈Ij vi,j.
In the ﬁrst stage, players x and y may choose to form an alliance. Rather than examine
the transfers that arise under a particular transfer game, our focus is on suﬃcient conditions
for a reallocation of resources among the alliance members to be Pareto improving for the
alliance members. That is, a self-enforcing alliance without commitment is said to exist if
there exist resource transfers, among the players with the common opponent, that increase
the payoﬀs of both players in their respective second-stage set of contests against the common
opponent. Clearly, there exist a number of possible transfer games that would implement
such Pareto improving transfers (see Kovenock and Roberson 2010a for further details).
Following a positive net transfer of ￿ from j to −j, the resulting budget constraints faced by
j and −j are R
￿
j ≡ Rj − ￿ and R
￿
−j ≡ R−j + ￿, respectively.
In the second stage, player A observes the updated budget constraints faced by players
x and y and then x and y individually compete with A in their respective sets of contests
subject to the updated budget constraints determined in the ﬁrst stage. The timing of the
two-stage game is summarized as follows:
1. The two players facing the common opponent (players x and y) have the opportunity
to reallocate resources among themselves.
11See also Robson (2005) who examines several extensions of Friedman (1958) including allowing for the
noise parameter, r, to take any value in (0,1].
42. Player A observes players x’s and y’s updated resource constraints, and then players x
and y individually compete against the common opponent, A, in their respective sets
of contests.
3 Alliances Without Commitment
Given the nature of the game, a subgame perfect equilibrium may be derived using backward
induction. We begin by solving for the Nash equilibrium in stage two, given that players x’s




y respectively. Given the optimal
strategies in stage two, we then investigate the stage one resource transfers.
Stage Two
The second stage of this game consists of two disjoint sets of two-player contests between A
and j ∈{ x,y}. Player A allocates RA across the two disjoint sets of contests Ix and Iy.E a c h
player j ∈{ x,y} allocates his entire budget across his set Ij of contests. Resource allocations
are made simultaneously. In the set of contests, Ij, players A and j each maximize their
expected payoﬀ subject to the constraint that the sum of their individual resource allocation
is no greater than their respective resource endowment. Because unused resources have no
value, in any equilibrium this constraint is binding.
Friedman (1958) characterizes the optimal resource allocations in the two-player multi-
item contest with the lottery CSF. Let RA,j denote the total amount of resources that player
A allocates across the set of contests, Ij.L e trA,i,j denote player A’s resource allocation to
contest i ∈ Ij, and let ri,j denote the resource allocation by player j ∈{ x,y} to contest





y respectively, the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium resource allocations to contest i ∈ Ij




A,i,j =( vi,j/Vj)RA,j for players j and A respectively.
Intuitively, each player’s allocation to battleﬁeld i is equal to the value of that battleﬁeld
relative to the total value of all the battleﬁelds in multi-item contest Ij multiplied by that
player’s total resource endowment. Let uA,i,j and UA,j denote player A’s payoﬀ in contest
i ∈ Ij and the sum of his payoﬀs across the set of contests Ij, respectively. Similarly, for
j ∈{ x,y} let ui,j and Uj denote player j’s payoﬀ in contest i ∈ Ij and the sum of his
payoﬀs across the set of contests Ij, respectively. In equilibrium, the total expected payoﬀs

















































Observe that the fraction of the total value of the set Ij that a player expects to win is
equal to the ratio of the total amount of resources that he allocates to the set divided by the
sum of all resources allocated to the set. Because player A’s optimal allocation of resources
to each component contest i ∈ Ij depends only on the relative value of that battleﬁeld and
player A’s total allocation of resources to the set Ij of contests, RA,j, characterizing player
A’s optimal division of resources to the two sets of contests Ix and Iy implicitly provides the
optimal allocations of resources to each of the component contests. We now solve for player
A’s optimal division of resources to the sets Ix and Iy of contests.




y,R A) and the total













−j)1/2) for some j ∈{ x,y}, then




























and to the set I−j of contests player A allocates
R
∗































−j)) then player A allocates no resources
to the set Ij of contests and all of his resources, RA, to the set I−j of contests. In this case,
it is clear that no self-enforcing alliance without commitment forms.





6spectively, player A’s optimization problem is given by:
max
RA,j,RA,−j













V−j s.t. RA,j + RA,−j ≤ RA
Because the sum E(UA,j)+E(UA,−j) is increasing in both RA,j and RA,−j player A
optimally sets R∗
A,j + R∗
A,−j = RA.L e t E(UA) ≡ E(UA,j)+E(UA,−j). It is worth noting
that E(UA) is strictly concave in (RA,j,R A,−j). Thus, the ﬁrst-order conditions are both
necessary and suﬃcient for an interior local maximum. At an interior equilibrium, the ﬁrst-








































Finally, see that player A need not allocate a strictly positive level of resources to both







the marginal return to player A for allocating his last unit of resources to the set I−j of
contests exceeds the marginal payoﬀ from the ﬁrst unit of resources allocated to set Ij.I n
this case, player A optimally allocates zero resources to the set Ij of contests and all of his
resources, RA, to the set I−j. In such a case, player j’s payoﬀ is equal to Vj. Obviously, if the
initial endowments warrant player A allocating no resources to set Ij, then because player
j cannot strictly increase his payoﬀ, by transferring resources to player −j, a self-enforcing
alliance without commitment does not arise.
Because self-enforcing alliances without commitment arise only in interior equilibria, we
focus on the case where player A allocates a strictly positive level of resources to both sets
of contests Ij and I−j. Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (1) it follows that













Rx + Ry + RA
(5)













Rx + Ry + RA
. (6)
Player A’s total expected payoﬀ is the sum of his payoﬀs from both sets of contests Ix and



















Rx + Ry + RA
. (7)
Examining equation (7), it is apparent that player A’s equilibrium total expected payoﬀ




xVy)1/2. Conversely, because this
is a constant-sum game, the sum of player x’s and y’s equilibrium total expected payoﬀs
decreases as this diﬀerence increases.
Stage One
In stage one, players x and y have the opportunity to transfer resources among themselves.
We focus on self-enforcing alliances without commitment in which only mutually beneﬁcial
exchanges of resources take place. If player j transfers a strictly positive amount, ￿>0,
of resources to player −j, then player A observes this alliance transfer and allocates his
resources across the sets of contests Ij and I−j taking into account player j’s and −j’s
updated budget constraints.
As outlined previously, a self-enforcing alliance without commitment forms only if, in the
absence of an alliance transfer, player A would choose to allocate a strictly positive level
of resources to each set of contests. Thus, we restrict our attention to interior equilibria.
Without loss of generality, consider the case where player j transfers ￿>0 to player −j.






Vj(Rj − ￿)V−j(R−j + ￿)







Vj(Rj − ￿)V−j(R−j + ￿)
Rx + Ry + RA
(9)
Theorem 2. If the combination of the initial resource constraints (Rx,R y,R A) and the total






(Vj/V−j) for some j ∈{ x,y}, then a self-enforcing alliance
without commitment exists (in which player j transfers a positive level of resources to player











Proof. It may be readily veriﬁed that the conditions of Theorem 2 imply that, in the absence
of any alliance transfers, player A allocates a strictly positive level of resources to each set of
contests. Thus, any transfer from player j to player −j yields the expected utilities, E(U￿
j)
and E(U￿
−j), given equations (8) and (9) above. A Pareto improving transfer from player










￿=0 > 0. If both inequalities
hold, then there exists a strictly positive transfer from player j to player −j that strictly





￿=0 > 0 if

























Note that condition (a) implies condition (b). Thus, if player j is willing to transfer a portion
of his endowment, player −j is always willing to accept the gift. That is, for any transfer
from player j to player −j, the direct beneﬁt to player −j from the additional resources
alway overcomes the indirect eﬀect from the strategic shift in player A’s resources towards
the set I−j of contests. Moreover, note that because the right hand side of condition (a)
is strictly positive, if a transfer of resources occurs, it must be the case that Rj >R −j.
Thus, transfers always ﬂow from the resource wealthy player to the resource poor player.
Therefore, if condition (a) holds, then no transfers from −j to j will occur.
As previously mentioned, the speciﬁc choice of the transfer depends on the speciﬁcation
of the transfer game. Condition (a) given above provides a necessary condition for a strictly
9positive transfer to arise in equilibrium. Surprisingly, the boundary for alliance formation
established in condition (a) is equivalent to one of the boundaries established in Kovenock
and Roberson (2010a) (heretofore referred to as KR).
KR examines the formation of self-enforcing alliances without commitment using two
disjoint Colonel Blotto games (with auction CSFs in each component contest) in the second
stage. Figure 1 shows, under the two CSFs, player A’s expected payoﬀs in the set of contests
against player j as a function of RA,j. As illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1, under the





j, player A experiences diminishing marginal returns. In contrast, as illustrated
in panel (a), under the lottery CSF player A faces diminishing marginal returns for all values
of RA,j.




















In this case, player A equates his marginal returns across the two sets of contests Ix and Iy,
and in each set of contests player A is in the region of diminishing marginal returns. For such
parameter conﬁgurations, condition (a) outlined above provides a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for mutually beneﬁcial alliance transfers to arise. Note that for such parameter
conﬁgurations, the alliance formation boundaries are identical under both the lottery and
auction CSFs.












j, then KR show that as
player A equates his marginal returns across the two sets of contests Ix and Iy he enters the








In this case, mutually beneﬁcial transfers from player j to player −j exist if and only if





For such parameter conﬁgurations, the alliance formation boundaries arising under the two
CSFs diverge.
Figure 2 illustrates, for ﬁxed values of RA, Vj, and V−j, the relationship between the
alliance formation boundaries under the two CSFs. Equation (a) provides the boundary for
alliance formation under the lottery CSF and is illustrated in Figure 2 by the bold (linear) line
segment. Under the lottery CSF, alliances will form in the region above this line. This line is













j. In such cases, the boundary delineating the region in which
self-enforcing alliances without commitment form is the same under both CSFs. The concave
line segment dividing Region 2 from Region 3 provides the alliance formation boundary for













That is, if the combination of the initial endowments (Rx,R y) and the total values for the two
sets of contests (Vx,V y) lies in Region 3, then a self-enforcing alliance without commitment
forms under the auction CSF but not under the lottery CSF.
Numerical Example
Suppose the initial endowments (Rx,R y,R A) are given by (32,2,20) and the valuations,
(Vx,V y), are given by (3,12). In the absence of alliance transfers, player A’s optimal strategy
is to allocate 4 units of resources to the set of contests in which he competes against player x
(Ix) and 16 units of resources to the set in which he competes against player y (Iy). Players
x’s and y’s total expected payoﬀs are (8/3) and (4/3), respectively. Notice that if j = x and
−j = y, then in this case condition (a) is satisﬁed. Thus, self-enforcing alliances without
commitment forms and the alliance transfers ﬂow from player x to player y. Such alliance











y)=( 1 /2). For example, consider an alliance transfer
of one unit of resources from player x to player y. The updated resource constraints are
R
￿
x = 31 and R
￿
y = 3. Given these updated resource constraints, player A optimally divides
his resources among the two sets of contests according to R∗
Ax ≈ 1.934 and R∗
Ay ≈ 18.067. In
this case, the new total expected payoﬀs are E(Ux) ≈ 2.834 and E(Uy) ≈ 1.709. Notice that
such a transfer between the alliance members strictly increases both players’ total expected
payoﬀs.
4 Alliances With Commitment
We now contrast the above characterization of self-enforcing alliances without commitment,
with that for alliances with full commitment (i.e. we now allow for ex post transfers among
alliance members). That is, players x and y pool their resources in the ﬁrst stage and then as
a single entity, denoted xy, compete against player A in the second stage. Let Rxy ≡ Rx+Ry
and Vxy ≡ Vx + Vy. Finally, let Ixy ≡ Ix ∪ Iy. Observe that this game is a two-player multi-
item Tullock contest between xy and A on the set Ixy. In examining such an alliance, an
issue that arises is how the winnings are distributed among the alliance members. Moreover,
11as frequently examined in the contest-theoretic literature on alliances, there is also an issue
regarding credible commitment to the distribution scheme. We digress from these issues,
and instead focus on the conditions under which the payoﬀ to the alliance exceeds the sum
of the payoﬀs to players x and y when they act as singletons. Let E(Ua
x) and E(Ua
y)b e
the equilibrium payoﬀs to players x and y, respectively, when they form an alliance with
complete commitment and let E(Uxy) ≡ E(Ua
x)+E(Ua
y). If E(Uxy) >E (U∗
x)+E(U∗
y), then




y). Thus, an alliance
with complete commitment forms if and only if E(Uxy) >E (Ux)+E(Uy).
















Proof. In an alliance with complete commitment, the alliance maximizes their joint payoﬀ




y ≤ Rxy. Thus, the second stage amounts
to a two player, multi-item Tullock contest between the alliance, xy , and player A on
the set of contests, Ixy.L e t rxy,i and rA,i denote the allocations to contest i ∈ Ixy by
the alliance xy and player A, respectively. Applying Friedman’s (1958) characterization of
equilibrium, the optimal resource allocation to each component contest i ∈ Ixy is given by:
r∗
xy,i =( vi/Vxy)Rxy and r∗










y)=( Vx/Vy). As a result, alliance transfers between players x and y arise




y) ￿=( Vx/Vy). Speciﬁcally, player j transfers a strictly positive level of





Remarkably, KR show that under the auction CSF the equilibrium for the alliance with




y)=( Vx/Vy). That is, the boundary for resource
transfers in the alliance with full commitment is equivalent under the two CSFs. This




−j. If the the combination of
the initial endowments (Rx,R y) and the total values for the two sets of contests (Vx,V y) lies on
either side of this line, then an alliance with complete commitment forms under both CSFs.
When this occurs the alliance transfers shift the resource constraints of players x and y toward
this alliance boundary. It is also worth noting the relationship between the formation of self-
enforcing alliances without commitment and alliances with full commitment. In both types





−j. But, in the case of the self-enforcing alliance without commitment,
incentive compatibility prevents the alliance from reaching such allocations.
5 Conclusion
In examining the robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances, we ﬁnd that,
for a non-empty subset of initial conﬁgurations, the boundary for alliance formation under
the lottery CSF corresponds exactly with the alliance boundary arising under the auction
CSF. Moreover, if the players can form an alliance with complete commitment, then the
outcomes in the two models are equivalent. The boundary for self-enforcing alliances without
commitment under the Lottery CSF diverges from the boundary under the auction CSF once
the player’s resource endowments cross a threshold. Over this range, the alliance region under
the auction CSF is strictly larger, and as a consequence, there exist parameter conﬁgurations
for which alliances form under the auction CSF but not under the lottery CSF. Given that
in a host of single and multiple contest applications the lottery CSF and the auction CSF
yield qualitatively diﬀerent equilibrium predictions, we ﬁnd it quite surprising that alliances
formed by players who share no common interest other than a common opponent are largely
robust to the speciﬁcation of the contest success function.
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(a) Lottery Contest Success Function 
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Figure 1: Player ’s expected payoff in 















Figure 2: Boundaries of alliance formation for 
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